Management of (sic) Current IDPs & Swat as a case study
I attended a session on the following topics on 27th August 2014 while being Secretary Admin FATA & made a presentation, the writeup of which is as under:-
“Disaster Management In Pakistan
– Historical Experiences And Way Forward”
(i)
Management
of Current IDPs & Swat as a case study
(ii)
Risk Reduction and Disaster Management Measures
On
27th August, 2014
At 1130-1400
hrs
By
Muhammad
Abid Majeed
Secretary Administration
& Coordination FATA
List of Acronyms
CAR
|
Commissioner
Afghan Refugees
|
NADRA
|
National
Database Registration Authority
|
|
DNA
|
Damage and
Needs Assessment
|
NATO
|
North
Atlantic Treaty Organization
|
|
DP
|
Displaced
Persons
|
NDMA
|
National
Disaster Management Authority, Pakistan
|
|
DRM
|
Disaster
Risk Management
|
NDMC
|
National
Disaster Management Commission, Pakistan
|
|
ERRA
|
Earthquake
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority
|
NFIs
|
Non Food
Items
|
|
ERU
|
Emergency
Response Unit for Malakand DPs
|
NGO
|
Non Governmental
Organizations
|
|
FATA
|
Federally
Administered Tribal Areas
|
NWFP
|
North West
Frontier Province (Now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)
|
|
FDMA
|
FATA
Disaster Management Authority
|
PaRRSA
|
Provincial
Relief, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority, KP
|
|
GOC
|
General Officer
Commanding
|
PDMA
|
Provincial
Disaster Management Authority KP
|
|
GoP
|
Government
of Pakistan
|
PRC
|
Provincial
Relief Commissioner
|
|
HoH
|
Head of
Household
|
PRCS
|
Pakistan
Red Crescent Authority
|
|
IASC
|
UN Inter
Agency Standing Committee
|
SSG
|
Army’s Special
Support Group for Malakand DPs headed by then Commander 1 Corps
|
|
ICRC
|
International
Committee of Red Cross
|
UN
|
United
Nations
|
|
IDPs
|
Internally
Displaced Persons
|
UNDP
|
United
Nations Development Program
|
|
IHL
|
International
Humanitarian Law
|
UNHCR
|
United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees
|
|
INGO
|
International
Non Governmental Organization
|
UNICEF
|
United
Nations International Children Emergency Fund
|
|
KP
|
Province of
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
|
UNOCHA
|
United
Nations Office for Coordination and Humanitarian Affairs
|
|
MSF
|
Medicins
Sans Frontieres
|
WFP
|
World Food
Program
|
|
WHO
|
World
Health Organization
|
DP crisis - Complex
Emergency
Disasters are categorized into natural and man-made. [1]
For dealing with IDPs, or simply DPs, the classification of complex emergency is
used. The UN definition of complex
emergency is a major humanitarian crisis of a multi-causal nature that requires
a system-wide response. Commonly, a long-term combination of political,
conflict, and peacekeeping factors is also involved. The hallmark of disasters
and complex emergencies is the need for external assistance and aid. [2]
[3]
DPs and International
Law
Refugees and DPs are protected under International Humanitarian Law. Refugees are people who have crossed an international frontier and are at
risk or have been victims of persecution in their country of origin. IDPs, on
the other hand, have not crossed an international frontier, but have, for
whatever reason, also fled their homes. Strictly defined, involuntary departure
distinguishing IDPs from individuals who leave their areas of origin out of
choice & could have otherwise safely remained where they lived. [4]
There is
no convention for IDPs equivalent to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Nonetheless,
international law protects persons from displacement and once they are IDPs,
are protected by IHL and domestic law. Under IHL, people are protected from and
during displacement as civilians, provided they do not take a direct part in
hostilities. IHL also guarantees access for relief and
humanitarian organizations to refugees and IDPs in situations of armed
conflict. Parties to a conflict must facilitate the supply of relief materials
such as medicines, food, blankets and tents. [5]
Host states bear
the primary responsibility for IDP protection and welfare. If unwilling or
unable to meet IDP needs, international humanitarian actors may complement the
national authorities’ efforts at the latter’s request.
The 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were recognized by Member States of UN as
the principal international framework outlining IDPs’ rights. No single UN agency
is formally incharge of IDPs.
Operationally; UNHCR has been entrusted to
lead protection efforts of crisis-affected IDPs. In raising awareness to the
plight of IDPs, UN-OCHA works in close partnership with Security Council
bodies, UNHCR, the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs to the Human
Rights Council, protection-related IASC agencies and UN Secretariat
organizations to promote the development of national legal frameworks and
policies on internal displacement.[6]
UNOCHA
or simply OCHA is
the part of the UN Secretariat responsible for bringing together
humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies. OCHA also
ensures there is a framework within which each actor can contribute to the
overall response effort. [7]
Humanitarian Response
The internationally accepted Minimum Standards in
Humanitarian Response in such situations have been determined in the late 1990s
to enhance the effectiveness and accountability of assistance, and have been
constantly improved by the international agencies, humanitarian NGOs and other
stake holders based on the philosophy; “the right to life with dignity”. The
two responses are (i) Relief; and (ii) Protection. [8]
The two core beliefs are: firstly; right to life with dignity and therefore
right to assistance, and secondly; all possible measures to alleviate human
suffering arising out of a disaster or crisis, hence protection.
The key
life-saving sectors include water supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion;
food security and nutrition; shelter, settlement and non-food items; and health
action. The ‘Protection’ principles include activities that benefit in
particular those who are most affected and vulnerable, such activities
contribute towards protection against violence and human rights abuses or
recovery from such abuses. Women, children, older people, persons with
disabilities may be denied vital assistance or the opportunity to be heard due
to physical, cultural and/or social barriers and are therefore the vulnerable.
The
roles and responsibilities of humanitarian agencies in protection are, generally,
secondary to the legal responsibility of the state or other relevant
authorities. Protection often involves reminding these authorities of their
responsibilities.
Role of Armed Forces in Humanitarian Response
As
part of the United Nations Protection Force for Bosnia NATO command realized
that as a ‘force’ having all the logistics, air support and manpower, a
fighting force could also provide direct support in humanitarian assistance. [9]
It was during that time too that the Pakistan Army also realized this and
participated in humanitarian efforts.
“Recognizing the commendable
performance of the Pakistan Army Contingents as UN Peacekeepers in Somalia and Kampuchea,
the UN requested the GoP to contribute troops to the United Nations Protection Force
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A 3000 strong contingent consisting of two Battalion Groups
and a National Support Headquarters left for Bosnia and Croatia in May 1994.
The two-battalion groups were deployed in the towns near the city of Tuzla in
Bosnia while the National Support Headquarters remained based at Split,
Croatia. They were tasked to stabilize the military situation with a view to
encouraging return of normalcy, improving freedom of movement by maintaining
existing routes, providing protection and supporting various UN agencies and
NGOs engaged in their relief activities and coordinate humanitarian assistance”
[10]
The UN has
recognized a United
Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) mechanism
maintaining that it is necessary that there is essential dialogue and
interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies to
protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize
inconsistency, and when appropriate, pursue common goals. Basic strategies
range from co-existence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility
facilitated by liaison and common training. [11]
The Pakistani military plays an important role in emergency
response within the country too. In the light of increasing decentralization of
Disaster Risk Reduction to provinces and districts, there is need to strengthen
civil-military coordination to pursue common goals and minimize
inconsistencies. Coordination as a shared responsibility should include a)
joint planning covering agreed alert and mobilization procedures; b)
information sharing including the sharing of Standard Operating Procedures, c)
task division; and d) hand-over procedures between civilian authorities and the
military where appropriate. Joint simulations can help to clarify coordination
and cooperation modalities. Overall there is a need to define the use of military assets in natural, industrial
and conflict emergencies (as well as in emergencies where conflict and natural
hazards overlap) in specific guidelines for Pakistan. [12]
Risk Reduction And Disaster
Management Measures – Pakistan’s perspective
In December 2006 in
the backdrop of Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA, 2005-2015) and earthquake 2005
in the country, the National Disaster Management Ordinance was introduced as a
legal instrument for disaster management in Pakistan. This legal instrument
provides for the establishment of an institutional system and legal framework
for all phases of disaster including inter-alia: prevention, mitigation, preparedness,
contingency planning (Pre-disaster phase), rescue, response, relief (during
disaster phase) and early recovery, rehabilitation, reconstruction
(Post-disaster phase) in addition to devising policies and strategies and
developing Disaster Risk Management plans and programs at federal, provincial,
and district levels.
Swat DPs – Humanitarian
Response
In the first week of May 2009, Pakistan Army launched an
operation against the militants in Buner, Lower Dir and Swat. According to the
verified estimates of NADRA, some 2 million people from the Malakand Division
left their homes and fled to camps, schools, homes and other places of shelter
across N.W.F.P. Those who were in the camps, had to live in temperature above
40 degrees and the risk of dehydration and disease was extremely high. Those
who were not living in the camps had taken refuge with host community,
relatives, friends, and schools or in rented houses. The host community was
bearing an extra burden to provide IDPs adequate shelter, food and other necessities,
as it did not have the capacity to do so. Some family members (mostly women and
children) fled their areas of origin while others (mostly men and teenage boys)
stayed behind to safeguard their homes. It was very difficult for them to
secure food and shelter. The IDPs had been deprived off their livestock assets
and economic means and had no source of sustainable income.
UNHCR head, Antonio Guterres, said the displacement was
bigger and faster than the movement of people following the Rwandan genocide in
1994. The mass exodus of the IDPs had put an immense pressure on the government
of Pakistan as well as the international community to respond to the needs of
the displaced people.
The Chief Secretary KP established an ERU, comprising senior
officers, to strengthen the PRC and the PDMA setup, and with the main objective
to mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in
partnership with government, non-government, national and international
agencies and all the stakeholders in order to lessen human suffering in the
IDPs crisis. In addition to being a coordinator, the ERU also acted as an
administrator and organizer by managing and monitoring the IDPs camps and
organizing various events and training sessions for the IDPs to improve their
living conditions and standards. Parallel to this, the Pakistan Army
established an SSG headed by the Commander 1 Corps, placed at Peshawar. After a
while the SSG placed one of its officers in ERU and vice versa and the
coordination got more efficient consequently.
(ii)
Strategic Organization of ERU
The ERU was structured in:
a)
Policy and Strategy Committee,
b)
Operational Coordination Committee, and
c)
Clusters
The Policy and Strategy committee worked under the Chief
Secretary N.W.F.P. It had membership from PRC-ERU, SSG, UN-OCHA, UNHCR, WHO,
UNICEF, ICRC, MSF, UNDP, Home Secretary, FATA Secretariat, Social Welfare
Department of the NWFP, and the CAR. These members performed the following
tasks:
Members
|
Assistance
|
PRC-ERU
|
Operations and Response Coordination
|
SSG (1 Corps)
|
Coordination and ERU Support
|
OCHA
|
Humanitarian Coordination
|
WFP & FAO
|
Food and Agriculture / Logistics
|
UNHCR
|
Camp Management, Protection, Shelter & NFI
|
WHO
|
Health
|
UNICEF
|
Nutrition, Education, WASH
|
ICRC
|
Observer
|
MSF
|
Observer
|
UNDP
|
Early Recovery
|
Home Secretary
|
Law and Order
|
FATA Secretariat
|
FATA affairs
|
Social Welfare
|
Registration outside camps
|
Commissionerate for Afghan Refugee
|
Registration inside Camp
|
(iii) The
Relief Clusters
The ERU worked with nine different cluster that are Health
and Nutrition, WASH, Food and Agriculture, Camp Management, Protection,
Logistics, Education, Shelter and Early Recovery Network, in order to
strengthen the technical and administrative capacity during the provision of
humanitarian aid. The lead international agencies in these clusters are given
in the table at (ii) above.
(iv)
DP Camps Management
UNHCR was mainly responsible for the management of the IDP
camps and ERU appointed Civil Officers as Camp In-charges. and also briefed 45 probationers and
appointed them as in-charges of the food hubs. Camps were established in
Mardan, Swabi, Charsadda, Nowshera and Peshawar. Around 12 % of the DP families
got themselves registered in Camps but a majority lived off camp and kept the
registration in camp for the purposes of obtaining cooked food initially and
dry rations later. The SSG provided security to the camps and dedicated its
officers for coordination purposes.
(v)
Communications strategy
The Media Cell of ERU established a website that offered
assessments, situation reports, minutes, meeting schedule, financial tracking
system, and a contact directory amongst many other useful services and
information. Through these efforts ERU ensured that information collected and
analyzed by clusters was shared with all the stakeholders. UN-HABITAT was asked
to convert the available information into maps. SSG also held regular press
briefings.
(vi)
The 3 x Ws
One of the
most singular initiatives was to frame a crystal statement of “Who is doing
What & Where”. Exact details of which NGO, INGO, donor or humanitarian
organization, government’s department and the Pakistan Army through SSG were
not only maintained but also shared with each stakeholder. This resulted in
efficient response and avoidance of duplication of efforts and wastage of
resources.
(vii)
Off-Camp DPs
74 % of the DP
families lived off Camp with host families while 13 % occupied space in 3683
Government schools. The occupation of these schools could have seriously jeopardized
the start of educational activities after summer vacations but the IDPs
returned to their area of origin before that.
Out of the
off-camp families Mardan hosted 43 % followed by 20 % in Swabi and 16 % in
Peshawar. These DPs as well as their host families were provided immediate
support through access to health and education facilities in the area, direct
support with household items, food and shelter materials. IDPs living in rented
accommodation could not afford payments. These IDP families were given access
the “Benazir Support Program” Cash Grant
scheme with a payment of Rs 1000/- per family per month and facilitated
through NADRA in issuance of computerized National Identity Cards to women. A
relief package of Rs. 25000 from the provincial government and Rs. 5000 from Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal to each family were also
given.
(viii)
Smart Cards
“Smart” IDP
registration cards were issued by NADRA with support from UNHCR, which allowed
a more efficient management of assistance to the registered families. The cards
allowed to “load” cash assistance, vouchers for NFIs and food and access to
services.
(ix)
Security
The Pearl Continental
Hotel in Peshawar was bombed on 9 June 2009. All International Staff were
evacuated from Peshawar. Two UN staff (UNICEF & UNHCR) were killed and two
WFP staff were injured during the attack. The entire operation came to a halt.
UN offices in Peshawar reopened on 11 June with National Staff.
(x)
Transparency in financial management
To ensure, and to be seen to have ensured, financial transparency details
of all expenditure were placed on the web site and a Donation Tracking System
was set in place. The donors could also track their donation by entering the
receipt number in the Donation Tracking System on the ERU website. To enhance
the credibility of Pakistan with the donor agencies, the food items were given
to the WFP and other UN agencies.
(xi)
Registration Process of NGOs and INGOs
GoP
had an open-door policy to most INGOs arriving in mid-1980s, largely due to the
substantial funding which was being received from USAID. Since 1990, Pakistan
has suffered several disasters. During this period there has been a
corresponding increase in the number of humanitarian agencies based in
Pakistan. When the earthquake hit Pakistan on 8 October 2005, very few
humanitarian agencies were in an immediate position to respond. The Government
of Pakistan response to the earthquake was swift.
Within
12 hours, an open invitation to international humanitarian agencies had been
issued, and the Government made efforts to facilitate their arrival,
registration and access. For example, the need for a No Objection Certificate
which international agencies must usually obtain for access to certain areas
such as AJK was removed, enabling free international access to sensitive areas
for the first time in decades. The openness of the Government led to a huge
influx of international humanitarian agencies in the weeks following the
earthquake.
In
the past, Government of Pakistan mostly relied on humanitarian and donor
agencies every time a disaster struck. But in the IDPs crisis ERU as a
government institution applied a better approach and made sure that in each
cluster the donor agencies were led by a government agency, ensuring the
participation of the government in the relief efforts.
(xii)
Early Recovery Framework
In ordinary
circumstances anywhere in the world, the UN system conducts a Rapid assessment
for the early recovery / community restoration. In the case of Malakand
however, it was the provincial government, which took the initiative much
before the UN (local knowledge and access were the main advantages). Because of
the commitment of the provincial government ample allocations were also made
and by the time the UN, through UNDP, unveiled its early recovery framework i.e.
Conflict Early Recovery Initial Needs Assessment (CERINA), the government was
already half way through its early restoration works. This had the advantage of
diversion of UN resources to the much-needed rehabilitation of social sectors.
(xiii)
Damage and Needs Assessment
In April 2009, the GoP requested International Financial
Institutions including the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank to help in
validating a DNA for medium to long term recovery in the five crisis affected
districts of NWFP and two tribal agencies of FATA. The broad scope of work of
the DNA includes: (a) quantification and validation of physical damages caused
by the crisis; (b) development of sector level strategies for the immediate
restoration of (public and private) infrastructure, services, and livelihoods,
and; (c) quantification of corresponding needs in respect of the immediate
reconstruction and rehabilitation of critical damaged infrastructure and
services and the restoration of livelihood opportunities.
The DNA was led by ADB and WB. The team was facilitated by
the Economic Affairs Division of GoP, PaRRSA and the SSG. The total estimated
cost of immediate reconstruction and recovery is US $1,087 million for the five
NWFP districts and two FATA agencies. The sectors covered have been broadly
classified as: Social Sectors (Livelihood and Social Protection, Housing,
Education, Health); Physical Infrastructure (Transport, Water and Sanitation,
Energy);
Productive Sectors (Private Sector, Agriculture, Livestock, and
Irrigation); and Cross cutting Themes (Environment and Governance Infrastructure).
[14]
North Waziristan DPs –
Humanitarian Response [15]
Operation Zarb-e-Azb was initiated by the
Pakistan Army against militancy in North Waziristan Agency and the Agency was
declared as ‘Conflict Zone’ on June 18, 2014. In order to protect the lives of
the residents, the inhabitants of the area were asked to move to safer places.
Resultantly, the tribesmen started movement out of the Agency.
(i)
Establishment of a Response Unit
Probably as two different governments were involved (which
was more the reason to have one), no singular ERU has been established in the
civilian set-up. The PM House has however notified GOC 45 Engrs Div as the
Coordinator, who has established a small Secretariat. The PDMA and FDMA are
working under separate hierarchies with the Chief Secretary being the
commonality. Meetings happen in GHQ, SAFRON, at Governor’s House and other
offices regularly but there is no single grip or focal point. The apparent lack
or coordination and information can be attributed to the absence of a Policy
and Strategy set up backed by an Operational Coordination Committee.
(ii)
The Relief Clusters
The nine Relief cluster that are Health and Nutrition, WASH,
Food and Agriculture, Camp Management, Protection, Logistics, Education, Shelter
and Early Recovery Network are there but the international and national staff
is un-clear on who to respond and how to. Their support is readily available to
PDMA KP but when it comes to FATA there is less willingness due to the Army’s
implementation of security lens to the extreme. The DP Camp has been
established in FR Bannu in a security compromised and hostile weather area and
entry to it is strictly regulated. With such barriers, most UN Agencies and
INGOs find it improbable to provide support.
(iii) DP
Camps Management
UNHCR was mainly responsible for the management of the IDP
camps but as in the instant case there are issues of access and Army’s role in
management of the Camp, the Camp has been established by FDMA through federal
funding. Recently, Camp Incharge has been given enough space to try and
establish a management system. Only 565 families have so far gone to live in
the Camp, which is less than 1.5 % of the verified families.
(iv)
Communications strategy - CGTM
There is no central Media Cells, rather every Federal and
Provincial authority has been giving separate statements to media. The
prevalent trend is of CGTM, i.e. Credit Goes to Me. This has led to
fragmentation in response to public perception as well as the phenomenon of
VIPs going for ‘Disaster Tourism’ towards Bannu and the Camp, for photo
sessions and hindering relief activities.
(v)
The 3 x Ws
One of the
most singular initiatives of ERU was to frame a crystal statement of “Who is
doing What & Where”. Exact details of which NGO, INGO, donor or
humanitarian organization, government’s department and the Pakistan Army
through SSG were not only maintained but also shared with each stakeholder.
This resulted in efficient response and avoidance of duplication of efforts and
wastage of resources. There is NO such practice while dealing with DPs of
North.
(vi)
Off-Camp DPs
98.5 % of the
DP families are off Camp with host families including 2004 families in 986
schools. The families living in Schools in Bannu and FR Bannu are 3.5 % of the
overall verified families. The occupation of these schools has seriously jeopardized
the start of educational activities after summer vacations as the IDP families
are adamant in not leaving these buildings and there is no return plan in
sight.
(vii)
Cash Payments
The GoP has
approved payment of Rs 12000 monthly, Rs 20000 as Ramazan Package and Rs 5000
as one time grant for NFIs to IDPs. Government of KP has pledged Rs 3000 per
month as rent and Punjab Government has pledged Rs 7000 as monthly grant during
their stay. So for the first month the IDPs HoH got Rs 47000 and they will
continue getting Rs 22000 per month. Such a package has not been granted to any
IDPs previously. 96699 families have been registered by FDMA out of which 54080
have been verified. Till date (23 Aug, 2014) out of the 54080 NADRA verified
families, 50760 HoH have received Rs 1658 Mil only out of the Federal
Government fund alone.
The payment is
being made through Timepay ® services of Zong Mobile Company and Askari Bank.
Food sustenance continues to be provided through the WFP despite the cash
grants on that account.
(viii)
Security Lens
Due to genuine
security concerns, the IDPs from North Waziristan have been dealt different to
all previous cases. The DP Camp is in an area not easily accessible even to
civil officers and machinery. Camps in Bannu have been discouraged. However,
despite such verifications etc, the data obtained from Zong about location of
payments drawn has shown that DP families are now all over Punjab, Sindh, some
areas of Baluchistan and nearly all the Districts of KP. The security lens has
however, to some extent, discouraged INGOs and local NGOs from supporting the
GoP in humanitarian effort.
(ix)
Registration Process of NGOs and INGOs
One of the reasons that
Malakand became a success story was the support of the UN, bilateral,
multi-lateral agencies as well as INGOs. This support helped bridge the
capacity and resource gap of the government. Starting from registration to
food, shelter, health, sanitation, education etc. specialized UN agencies and
INGOs partnered with the respective government departments. Because of the
security concern and a stronger lens focusing more on security operations, the
government decided to bar access to almost all the international organizations.
This has resulted in putting the whole burden on the government agencies in
delivery of services in all the above-mentioned sectors.
(x)
Early Recovery Framework
Since there is hardly an access to the international
organizations who could be expected to help the government in this important
activity, HQ 11 Corps, 45 Eng. Div. and FATA Secretariat have decided to initiate
this process as an in house activity. For this purpose, the forces deployed in
North Waziristan have already conducted a survey and prepared a report. This
assessment will serve as an initial baseline for a survey, which has already
started on 25th Aug 2014. Dedicated teams comprising of Pakistan
Army personnel, representatives of the government departments and, if possible,
local community will validate the list already prepared in the first phase of
the survey. The teams would add or delete the listings as per the physical
verification. This whole set of menu will also be validated through satellite
pictures of pre and post operation with the help of SUPARCO.
Disaster Management
Planning in Pakistan
As DRM encompasses a wider range of interests and abilities,
there is a growing requirement for political and professional collaborations
and partnerships. These inter-relationships address multi-level (national and
sub-national), multi-hazard (flood,
cyclone, earthquake, landslide, fire and volcano eruptions),
multi-sector (health, education, planning, transportation and construction),
multi-phase (preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery) and
multi-stakeholder (government, NGOs, community groups, private sector, and
civil society) approaches. [16]
Pakistan’s institutional structures for disaster management included
the ‘Emergency Relief Cell’ consequent to cyclone of 1970 in East Pakistan, [17] the Meteorological Department
with 73 Met Stations spread across the country, [18] the Federal Floods Commission, the
National Crisis Management Cell under the Ministry of Interior, the Civil
Defence, Dams Safety Council and the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research
Commission (SUPARCO). Its dependence of civil Departments such as Police,
Communication & Works, Irrigation and even the Pakistan Army still does not
indicate any management mechanism of DP crisis.
The GoP is more inclined towards managing response to
disaster, that too through an emergency response, than towards risk management
and focusing on the fundamental concepts of vulnerabilities leading to
disasters. However the October 8, 2005 earthquake that has changed the
perception and attitude of the government completely.
The Federal Relief Commission was established soon after the
2005 earthquake and it was mandated to streamline the relief operations in
collaboration with Provincial governments, relevant ministries, NGOs, Red
Crescent and other international agencies as well as the army. ERRA was created
in the mid of October, 2005 for the medium and long-term rebuilding efforts to
serve as the main interface with international lending institutions, other
international organizations, as well as with national authorities and
philanthropic organizations focusing on the rehabilitation of the affected
areas. The Federal Relief Commission was then absorbed into ERRA on 1st April
2006, which continues to be the principal actor in the reconstruction efforts.[19]
There is now a growing realization that hazard becomes a
disaster only when communities, structures and institutions are too weak and
vulnerable to withstand its force and there is a need of more coordinated and large-scale
relief response. Pakistan signed the full implementation of the Hyogo
Declaration and Hyogo Framework of Action 2005-2015 and the commitments related
to assistance for developing countries in the post-disaster recovery and
rehabilitation processes.[20]
On December 21, 2006 the National Disaster Management
Ordinance was passed which led to the formation of NDMC and NDMA. The NDMC,
which falls under the Prime Minister’s Secretariat, is the highest decision
making body for integration of disaster risk reduction and management into mainstream
development. NDMA has been established to be the coordinating body for cross-sectorial
disaster management program. NDMA major functions are identification of
national hazards and vulnerabilities, institutional, legal and community
capacity building, mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction into development and
coordinating the efforts of all national and international institutions working
in any sphere of disaster risk reduction. All national agencies such as ERRA,
Federal Flood Commission, Civil Defence, Fire Services, Drought Emergency
Relief Program, all government departments, ministries, media, NGO’s and donors
must make their resources available to NDMA and PDMA in case of disasters.[21]
DP Management protocols in
Pakistan
UN’s 30 guiding principals of Internal Displacement [22]
include that the national authorities have the primary duty and responsibility
to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to IDPs, there shall be no
discrimination based on race, language, beliefs, origins, age etc., displacement
should be as dignified as possible, every IDP would have the right to liberty
of movement and freedom to choose residence etc.
The
NDMA’s Monsoon Contingency Plan details what resources are existing and to be
maintained and what actions are required by various governments as well as
other stake-holders but there is no policy and no standard response for DP
crisis. The NDMA has taken measures to enhance the capacity of different stake holders and helping
them in understanding and practicing various aspects of disaster management
like early warning, planning / coordination / managing responses to urban and
rural flooding including: rescue, evacuation / relocation, camp management,
logistic needs and damage assessment but again there is no road-map for DP
displacement out of a conflict area.[23]
Similarly, the
Contingency Plan of the KP Government, which has been prepared after various
consultations with Provincial Departments, NDMA, Federal Agencies, Army Corps
of Engineers/ 11 Corps, District Administrations, PRCS, Humanitarian Community
including DRR Forum and NHN, painstakingly spells out in minute detail the
coordination mechanism for early warning, search and
rescue, relief operations and meeting needs of vulnerable segments for the
Monsoons and the duties of various stakeholders in that but there is no plan
whatsoever for DPs humanitarian support.
PDMA coordinates
execution of these functions with all provincial entities and federal agencies
i.e. Pak Armed Forces, NDMA, Emergency Relief Cell, National Logistic Cell,
Pakistan Metrological Department etc. PDMA also constitutes the point of
contact for deploying external assistance for disaster response through the
General Coordination Meeting (GCM) to UN agencies, INGOs and donors consistent
with provincial and national policies. Similar processes are followed at the
district tier by DCs assisted by the newly formed DDMUs.
The
plan even indicates the actions to be taken by the HQ 11 Corps of the Pakistan
army which are establishment of Flood Coordination Centres as per Army’s Plan,
assistance of provincial government in search & rescue and response
operations when
called in aid of civil administration etc. The plan goes on to
say that on formal requisitioning of Army in flood relief operation, all
available resources will be mobilized. [24]
Lessons Learnt, Issues and Way Forward
Despite
clear international regulations and standards, Pakistan’s disaster management
structure has no, or negligible, standards and procedures when it comes to DP
management. Moreover, when it comes to DP management across more than one
province or administrative units, there is no focused, unified command, policy
and strategy structure. The coordination mechanism under the Constitution is
provided in the shape of Council of Common Interests and Inter Provincial
Coordination Committee but such constitutional fora seldom meet and have
diverse directions of velocity due to political affiliations of the Provinces
or federal government. The National Disaster Management Commission also has
membership from the civil and military side but it does not translate into a
proper strategic and policy command structure with mandate to NDMA in
particular cases of complex emergency where the humanitarian effort is across
administrative units / provinces. That mandate can be there in the shape of
Civil Military Liaison Offices on the analogy of Civil Military Cooperation
(CIMIC) [25]mechanism
enunciated by NATO in Kosovo specifically for cooperation between NATO units on the one hand
and civilian institutions (including humanitarian organizations, the United
Nations, etc.) on the other.
The role and
strengths in human resource, logistics etc of Pakistan Army are being utilized
whenever there is a disaster or complex emergency. However, there is no
inter-institution coordination and roadmap for increasing efficiency of such
support. This is further exacerbated due to the lack of understanding of how
the civil and military institutions work by the military and civil bureaucracy respectively.
This gap becomes more acute when the issue of provision of finances for various
activities arises – both institutions have separate financial management
systems which are not compatible with each other. The compulsion of fulfilling
of codal formalities by one is taken as inaction by the other. A permanent
Civil-Military Coordination Mechanism based on proper role allocation and SOPs needs
to be set in place which keeps a liaison at all times and ups a gear or two
during complex emergencies. This arrangement would be in consonance with
Article 245 of the Constitution which enunciates calling upon the army in aid
of civil administration in any adverse circumstances.
The
phenomenon of CGTM (Credit Goes to Me) needs to be discouraged by making every
stakeholder realize the stakes of the other. The civil setup needs to
understanding that every action and operation against militants, even if
endorsed or led by political leadership, causes hardships to general public and
blame is placed squarely on the Armed Forces despite them sacrificing men and
material. Their initiatives to win hearts and minds is an effort towards
mellowing down such adverse reactions. Similarly, the khakis need to take
cognizance of the fact that the political leadership has the opposition and the
next election in the back of their mind. The best way forward in such a
situation would be a communication strategy based on coordinated optics, which
ensures joint face to the press and the people bearing the burden of criticism
and credit for kudos in the name of State of Pakistan.
While the
security lens in dealing with DPs coming out of conflict areas is important,
hindrances in grant of access to humanitarian agencies, INGOs and local NGOs
create misunderstandings and over-burdening of GoP in relief efforts which are
funded and managed by the UN Agencies the world over. Delays in grant of
security clearance deter such organizations as most of them are funded by tax
payers’ money of western countries and in the absence of access and monitoring
permissions it becomes very difficult for them to satisfy their donors.
Furthermore, such INGOs are acceptable world over and it becomes very difficult
for the local administration to defend non-grant of NOC to them. The easier way
would be that in case there are some elements whose activities are not
desirable, their entry should be regulated at the time of grant of visa – so
that the organizations could recommend alternate staff members. Similarly,
accounting system to ensure coupling of both military and civilian financial
management mechanisms in times of emergency needs to be done.
Statistics
show that in the Malakand Division IDP crisis less than 13 % of DP families
opted for Camps (and a sizable majority out of those too just for cooked food
and rations) and in the current movement, less than 1.5 % has opted for the
Camp while establishment and running of Camps is an expensive business. It is
therefore recommended that instead a sizable cash grant which takes care of
food sustenance, rented accommodation and a stipend for other expenditure is
granted to the families to make their own arrangements. One of the positives in
such an arrangement that the local economy of the host communities, which get
encumbered due to such a huge population mass making them a minority in their
own area and taxing the infrastructure and services, will also improve when the
DPs spend the money to acquire food, NFIs and other services.
[3] Miguel Albala-Bertrand, What is a complex
humanitarian emergency, Department of Economics, Queen Mary University of
London
[4] Handbook for the Protection of Internally Displaced
Persons, Global Protection Cluster Working Group, Mar 2010
[8] Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in
Humanitarian Response, The Sphere Project
[9] First hand interaction of General officer of NATO
with Mr Shakeel Qadir Khan, the then DG Provincial Disaster Management
Authority Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (now Secretary Law & Order, FATA)
[10] http://pakistanurduit.blogspot.com/2012/03/united-nations-protection-force-in.html accessed on Aug 20, 2014
[13] IDP Crisis 2009: An
Analysis of the Emergency Response Unit, Government of NWFP, Pakistan
[14] Preliminary Damage and
Needs Assessment, Immediate Restoration and Medium Term Reconstruction in
Crisis Affected Areas, prepared by Asian Development Bank and World Bank for
Government of Pakistan
[15] Report on DP’s support –
FDMA’s perspective, 31.7.2014
[16] Living with Risk: A Global Review of Disaster
Reduction Initiatives
[22] Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, United
Nations
[23] National Monsoon Contingency Plan 2014, National
Disaster Management Authority, Government of Pakistan
[24] Monsoon Contingency Plan 2014, Provincial Disaster
Management Authority Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
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